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In this paper we use Pindyck’s model (2002) to show that the discount rate may play an 
important role in explaining for the income-pollution pattern observed in the real world. Low 
levels of income involve high values of discount rate, that are obstacles to the adoption of a 
pollution abatement policy. Only when the discount rate falls, as a consequence of growth, 
will it be possible to implement measures for emissions reduction. Thus we are able to derive 
an inverse U-shaped income-pollution pattern, making use of an argument that has never yet 
been introduced in the economic debate on this issue. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In economic literature there is a heated debate around the causes of the inverse
U-shaped income-pollution pattern, that has been denominated ”Environmen-
tal Kuznets Curve” (EKC). Since the seminal paper by Grossman and Krueger
(1991), a lot of theoretical explanations have been supplied for this relationship.
For example John and Pecchenino (1994), to account for the EKC, propose an
overlapping generations model in which, as a consequence of economic growth,
the economy moves from a situation with zero investment in environmental
improvements, to an equilibrium with positive expenses to reduce ecological
damage. Some suggest that the income-pollution pattern depicted in the EKC
simply re‡ects the transition from a rural economy to a more polluted world,
as a consequence of industrialization, and towards a cleaner environment for
developed economies that may pay for ”green” services (Arrow et al., 1995).
There are models in which satiation of the consumers at a low level of pollution
is assumed, where additional improvement of the environment has a marginal
utility equal to zero (Jaeger, 1998), such that only with economic growth and
more harmful emissions do people become willing to devote scarce resources to
adopting clean technologies. Stokey (1998) considers that only dirty production
processes are implemented at the low level of per-capita income, and only when
the individual income reaches some threshold level will clean technologies be
available. Suri and Chapman (1998) and Rothman (1998) highlight the role of
industry decisions to transfer de…ling productions from rich to poor countries, to
justify the EKC (but it is not a process that we may repeat inde…nitely, WTO,
1999). Others emphasize the importance of creating stronger institutions for-
mation in developing countries, to internalize the environmental externalities
(Jones and Manuelli, 2000). Recently, López and Mitra (2000) have suggested
that di¤erences in corruption levels among developing and wealthy countries
may explain the EKC. New attempts to clarify the income-pollution pattern
refer to the individual revenue inequalities inside countries and political choice
mechanisms (Magnani, 2000). Andreoni and Levinson (2001), in a very sim-
ple static model, emphasize the role of increasing returns to scale in pollution
abatement technology, in supporting the hypothesis of the inverse U-shaped re-
lationships between the variables we are considering. Tahvonen and Salo (2001)
a¢rm that carbon emissions …rst rise and then fall with income growth without
any environmental policy. This happens just as a consequence of backstop tech-
nologies phenomena, at a high level of income and as a result of the increasing
scarcity of non-renewable resources. The changes in preferences for environ-
mental quality, as the people become more wealthy, have also been utilized to
explain the EKC (Di Vita, 2002). Finally, Horbach (2002) reproposes the ”eco-
logical structural change” hypothesis, based on the shift of output composition
that becomes less pollution-intensive as income increases, to justify the inverse
U-shaped income-pollution pattern.2
This short and incomplete survey regarding the possible economic explana-
2For a more detailed survey of the literature on the EKC, see Borghesi (1999).
2tions of the EKC is useful to a¢rm that no one has previously attempted to
explain the income-pollution pattern through the di¤erences in discount rates
among countries. Neither is it considered in recent econometric analyses re-
garding the topic of this paper, that include new independent variables in the
regressions (Hannes, 2002, Harbaugh, et al. 2002, Horbach, 2002). Nevertheless
the problem of choosing an appropriate discount rate for evaluating projects to
ameliorate environmental quality, has stimulated research to …nd the optimal
rate to make topical the ’far-distant future’, for problems that will in‡uence the
life of future generations, like global warming, lost of biodiversity, etc.. This is
a subject for discussion among general and environmental economists (Caplin
and Leahy, 1999, Henry, 1974, Percoco, 2002,Weitzman, 1998, 2001). Weitz-
man (2001) recently a¢rmed ” ... The concept of a ’discount rate’ is central to
economic analysis, as it allows e¤ects occurring at di¤erent future times to be
compared by converting each future dollar into equivalent present dollar ... ”.
The choice of a correct rate to make up-to-date future bene…ts is particularly
relevant in cases where problems of irreversibilities (for example lost of biodi-
versity) and uncertainty (like future costs of pollution accumulation or climatic
changes) emerge about some environmental damage (Pindyck, 1996, 2000), and
we want to know if it is worth implementing some environmental policy now
rather than delaying its adoption.
To highlight the relevance of the discount rate in economic decisions, we may
remember that the e¤ects of a fall in it are similar to those of a rise in the saving
rate in the Solow model, with an increase in capital stock and income (Romer,
1996). The neoclassical growth models assume an exogenous discount rate, this
makes the analysis simple, but, as shown by Joshi (1993), this condition may
bias the results, because it does not consider that this variable declines as income
and consumption rise (Fisher, 1930). This is the reason why some a¢rm that
the neoclassical school of thought is not able to account for the di¤erences in
discount rates between rich and poor countries (Hibbs, 2001).
There are other theoretical reasons to clarify why the discount rate is high
in poor and developing nations. Without trying to be exhaustive, we refer to
the scarcity of capital, the high risk premium in the …nancial market, the high
leverage of debt (foreign and domestic), political instability, the necessity to
devote scarce resources to satisfy present needs (Samwick, 1998), without taking
into account the rights of future generations, di¤erent intertemporal preferences
(Holden et al., 1998) and, …nally, the misspeci…cation of property rights of some
natural resources. All those reasons and statistical observations (Pearce et al.,
1999) univocally support our assumption. The social intertemporal preferences
of the countries are revealed by the discount rate, but the data of the latter,
unlike the former, could easily be found and used in empirical analyses.
At any point of time, the social planner of the economy we consider in the
model has to choose whether to adopt a costly social policy now to reduce
pollution, or to delay this decision until some other point in the future. The
environmental policy will be undertaken if the present value of the net social
bene…ts is positive. Under ceteris paribus conditions low discount rates encour-
age the policy adoption, while if it is high no measure will be launched to reduce
3pollution emissions.
Thus cross-countries di¤erences in the discount rates may be helpful to jus-
tify why in poor nations we …nd a positive relationship between income and
pollution, while the opposite happens in wealthy ones, in which the policy to
preserve the ecological system is implemented.
The main topic of this paper is to show that the inverse U-shaped income-
pollution pattern could be explained simply by referring to the di¤erences in
discount rate among countries, without any additional speci…cation in the model
or ad hoc assumptions. In particular, here we simply ignore the problem if the
EKC is caused by some market failures, because we agree with Levinson (2000),
who has shown that this phenomenon may be consistent either with or without
Pareto-optimality.
To the aims of this study we use the dynamic two-stage model developed by
Pindyck (2000, 2002). This theoretical framework is at the same time easy and
utilizable to investigate how emissions change as a result of income changes. In
its simple version, the behavior during the time of pollution stock depends on
the ‡ow of emissions and on two coe¢cients, that account for the static and
dynamic absorptive capacity of the natural environment. The choice whether
to adopt or not a costly environmental policy is based on the simple cost-bene…t
analysis. The discount rate plays a remarkable role in the decision regarding the
implementation of the policy, because a low level of it implies a higher present
value of future bene…ts, while if it is high this makes the adoption of measures
to reduce the environmental burden more di¢cult.
We introduce in Pindyck’s model a function of the social cost of pollution
reduction, in which the income and emissions are considered. This is neces-
sary to deal with the EKC, a problem not considered in the original version
of this theoretical framework.3 The income-pollution pattern is derived under
two di¤erent conditions. First, it is assumed that pollution emissions go imme-
diately to zero if a policy is adopted, and second the case of partial reduction
of emissions is considered. These two di¤erent hypotheses do not in‡uence the
relationships among pollution, discount rate and income. They determine very
di¤erent income-pollution patterns according to which assumption we adopt.
Here we con…ne ourselves to the relevance of the discount rate in explaining
the EKC, without considering some other important hypotheses accounted for in
Pindyck’s model, such as uncertainty and irreversibility, but our analysis could
be extended to the more complete version of Pindyck’s theoretical framework.
After this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we report Pindyck’s model brie‡y (2002). Section three is devoted
to showing how the discount rate and income levels may in‡uence the pollution
stock dynamics, under two di¤erent hypotheses, that pollution emissions go
immediately to zero, as a result of policy implementation, or that emissions may
be partially reduced. Section four aims to discuss our …ndings and implications
for economic policy.
3Note that Pindyck in his paper (2002) refers to CO2 and SO2 that are typical pollutants
considered in studies on the EKC (see Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Harbaugh et al., 2002).
42 The Simple Version of Pindyck’s Model
To the aims of this paper we make use of the same theoretical framework as
Pindyck (2002); just to render the reading of this work more easy, the basic
assumptions of his model are reported here. In the simple two-period model, a
state variable Mt is considered that represents one (or more) stock pollutants,
and the pollution emission Et is the ‡ow variable that controls Mt.I n t h e
absence of an environmental policy Et follows an exogenous trajectory, and




M = ¯E(t) ¡ ±M(t);
where 0 <¯· 1 is a parameter that measures the quantity of emissions
absorbed by the ecosystem, and ± is the natural rate at which M dissipates over
time. In Pindyck’s model the pollution stock rises continuously following its
motion equation, if a policy is not adopted. The ‡ow of social cost is given by
the function B(Mt;µ t),w h e r eµt changes stochastically during time, re‡ecting
changes in tastes and technologies. Assuming that B is linear in M; we set
(2) B(Mt;µt)=¡µtMt:
The social costs of undertaking an environmental measure are assumed to be
completely sunk, and its present value at the time of adoption, which is denoted
by K(E1), is a function of the size of the emission reduction.
The function that we want to maximize is the present value of social welfare
W
(3) W = »0
R 1
0 B(Mt;µ t)e¡rtdt ¡ »0K(E1)e¡r ~ T;
where »0 are the expectations at time t =0 , ~ T is the unknown time at which
the policy is adopted, and r is the discount rate.
To keep the analysis simple, we ignore, for the moment, the problems of
uncertainty and irreversibilities brought about by pollution emissions.
Solving (1),w em a ye x p r e s sMt as a function of time (Pindyck, 2002, p.
1681). Assuming that the policy is adopted at time T, such that Et = E0 for











e¡±t + M0e¡±t; for t>T :
Let M0 be the initial value of Mt; we may calculate the values of social
welfare WN, in cases where the policy is never adopted,
(5) WN = ¡
R 1







and in cases in which the environmental policy is implemented at time t =0 ,
such that the social cost is immediately carried and Et =0 . The social welfare
in this hypothesis will be W0,




The standard cost-bene…t analysis suggests adopting the policy if W0 >W N.
This simple theoretical framework is the starting point for our analysis, but we
may extend our …ndings to the more complicated version of Pindyck’s model.
3 The Role of the Discount Rate in Explaining
Pollution Abatement Decisions
Here we observe that, under ceteris paribus conditions, there will be some
threshold level of the discount rate ^ r such that WN = W0. Why are we
interested in this value of the discount rate? The answer is simple: ^ r is the wa-
tershed discount rate between the area in which the environmental policy will
be adopted, and the area in which pollution rises along its motion equation. In
fact, if r>^ r the environmental policy will never be undertaken, because it will
always be true that W0 <W N, such that Mt increases continuously following
its motion equation. However, when r<^ r, the measure to reduce pollution
will be implemented, such that M will decline during time. To calculate ^ r we
assume W0 = WN, and after some little algebra we get
(7) Kr2 + rK± ¡ ¯E0µ0 =0 ;
that is a quadratic equation, that we can easily solve to obtain the values of
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t et h a tm a k eW0 and WN equal.
We may give a numerical example, using the same values of parameters as
in Pindyck (2002), that we report in Table 1.
Table 1
Parameters Values
¯ (emissions absorbed by the ecosystem) 1
K (PV of cost of policy adoption) $2:000:000:000
E0 (emission rate) 300:000 tons/yr
µ0 (current social cost) $20 tons/yr
± (pollutant decay rate) 0:02
Using (7), we …nd that there are two values of ^ r, ^ r1 =0 :04863 and ^ r2 =
¡0:05586. The positive threshold discount rate is greater than that used by
Pindyck in his paper, such that our …ndings are compatible with his results and
parameter constellations.
All the values of the variable considered included between ^ r1 and ^ r2 allow
us to say that WN >W 0.
The negative values of the discount rate imply too high preferences for the
future. We may suppose that values of r close or equal to zero will be considered
by a benevolent planner who attributes great value to the future, especially, if
she takes into account the rights of future generations not represented at present
(Weitzman, 2001).









such that @2K=@r2 =2 K=¯µ0 > 0. We may draw the relationship described
by equation (8),i nF i g u r e1 ,
[Figure 1, about here]
in which we report the discount rate in the horizontal axis and the pollution
emissions in the vertical axis. The discount rate-pollution emissions pattern,
without any environmental policy, is described by an increasing and convex
curve E(r).T h e t h r e s h o l d ^ r line splits the positive quadrant in two parts,
such that for r<^ r the pollution emissions will be equal to zero, because the
environmental policy will be adopted, until the threshold level of the discount
rate is achieved and the environmental policy no longer undertaken, such that
E jumps to its optimal level without a social planner action. This implies that
in the …rst case the pollution stock declines at a rate ±Mt, while in the second
case (i.e. r>^ r ) Mt rises according to (1). The arrows show the dynamics of
E(r) in this model, when the choice to invest or not in environmental issues is
considered.
Our previous results imply that, under ceteris paribus conditions, all the
countries that have a discount rate lower than ^ r will show declining emissions
and stock of pollution, as a consequence of expenses to improve the environmen-
tal quality, while nations where r>^ r will see E and M increase over time. The
link between the discount rate and pollution emissions is almost new, and it is
not fully investigated in the economic literature regarding explanations for the
inverse U-shaped income-pollution pattern. The problem is that in the EKC,
pollution is considered as a function of income and not of r. In particular, in
Pindyck’s model I is not considered, because he takes directly into account the
costs of environmental policy adoption K, and considers it as a parameter, in
the numerical example.
To study how the discount rate a¤ects the income-pollution pattern we have
to amend Pindyck’s model, introducing a function of the pollution abatement
costs, that satis…es the common assumption posed in the economic literature
about this issue, and in which the income (output) is considered. In particular,
it is assumed that
(9) K = f(I;E)=I® + E1¡°;
this functional form of K respects the conditions @K=@I > 0, @K=@E < 0
used by McKitrick (1999, p. 309), and @2K=@E2 > 0 (Andreoni and Levinson,
2001, Pindyck, 2002), @2K=@I2 < 0. Under this assumption the social cost
of pollution abatement policy is concave-increasing in I (output), while K is
convex-decreasing in E. The parameter 0 <®· 1 expresses K as a direct
7function of the income, while °>1 considers pollution abatement costs change
as the emission changes.4
Through (9) we de…ne the social cost of environmental improvement at any














Thus we may a¢rm that pollution emissions are increasing with income. In
the absence of social expenditure in environmental aims, the stock of pollution
will rise during time along with its motion equation as the income growth.
Finally, to know the link existing between the discount rate and I,w ee m -
ploy again (7), after putting
¡
I® + E1¡°¢
for K, and calculating the implicit






(I® + E1¡°)(2r + ±)
< 0.
This means that there is an inverse relationship between r and I.I no t h e r
words, countries with a low income level will have a high discount rate, such
that this alone may explain why in poor nations the environmental policy will
not be adopted, therefore growth in the poor countries (where r>^ r ) involves
an increase in the pollution stock. Only when the threshold level of the discount
rate is reached, as a result of growth, will ecologically friendly measures be im-
plemented and Mt decline. For r<^ r, an increase in income implies a reduction
in pollution stock.
To analyse how M changes during time with changes in I, thus deriving the
income-pollution pattern in this theoretical framework, we put in evidence E0
in (7), under the assumption K =
¡
I® + E1¡°¢
, and substituting in (4) for E0,
and then in (1) for Mt. After some little algebra, remembering that E =0if a
policy is adopted, we get
















The …rst row of (12) describes _ M when 0 · t · T and r>^ r, while the
second line of the equation above represents the dynamics of pollution stock
when t>Tand r<^ r.
Taking the …rst partial derivative of _ M with respect to I, the results will be
4It is worth highlighting that even using (8) and substituting in (7) to K, it is still veri…ed


















e¡±t < 0; for r<^ r:
It is worth noting that _ M is a concave-increasing function of income for r>^ r
and a convex-decreasing function of I for r<^ r. This means that the stock of
pollution increases as income rises, following the motion equation described by
(1),u n t i lr decreases to its threshold level ^ r,a tw h i c hMt reaches its maximum
level. For levels of the discount rate lower than ^ r, Et =0(remember that in
this simple version of the model the pollution emissions are entirely eliminated
as a consequence of environmental policy adoption) and Mt will decline during
time at the rate ±Mt.
We may summarize the information obtained from the previous analysis in
Figure 2 below,
[Figure 2, about here]
in which we report the income in the horizontal axis and the dynamics of
pollution stock in the vertical axis, and account for the second horizontal axis
where the discount rate is considered. Thus we are able to show that the income-
pollution pattern, in a modi…ed Pindyck’s model, is …rst concave-increasing and
then convex-decreasing, starting from the discount rate level at which the policy
is adopted. The irregular form of the curve we draw in Figure 2 may be explained
remembering that we assume that when an environmental policy is undertaken
the pollution emissions immediately drop to zero. The maximum point of _ M(I)
occurs when the discount rate is equal to its threshold value ^ r, and a compatible
level of income.
T h eb o l dl i n ea n da r r o w ss h o wt h eb e h a v i o ro f _ M as income changes. Note
that _ M(I) increases slowly until the threshold level of the discount rate is
achieved, and then declines quickly because













The income-pollution pattern that we have derived could be not consistent with
the empirical evidence, which suggests that pollution emissions …rst increase
quickly and, after policy adoption, decline slowly.
3.1 Allowing for Partial Reduction of Pollution Emissions
The condition that emissions drop immediately to zero when an expense to
ameliorate the environmental quality is implemented could be unrealistic, be-
cause usually the process to reduce pollution emissions is not instantaneous.
Thus we …nd it interesting to consider the case of a partial reduction of E as a
consequence of environmental policy adoption, and that K is a function of the
reduction in the pollution emissions.
Here we use the same functional form of the social cost of partial pollution
abatement policy as in Pindyck’s paper (2002, p. 1686), that is
9(14) K = k1(E0 ¡ E1)+k2(E0 ¡ E1)2;
such that dK=dE < 0 and d2K=dE2 > 0, i.e. K is convex-decreasing in
E1. With k1;k 2 ¸ 0,a n dE1 is the new level of pollution emissions after the
pollution abatement policy is implemented. Note that (14) is the same as the
equation [17] in Pindyck (2002).
In this case the problems are when to adopt a provision to preserve the
environment and how much to reduce E.W ea s s u m et h a tµT may be equal to ¹ µ
or µ
¡ with the same probability, that it does not change after time T,a n dt h a t
the policy adopted cannot be reversed. Solving (1) in the case in which the














+ M0e¡±t; for t>T:
Suppose we reduce E from E0 to an arbitrary level E1 at t =0 , such that








If the environmental investment is never adopted, the value of welfare func-
tion is







Such that the pollution abatement policy will be launched if and only if




(E0 ¡ E1) ¡ K(E1)=0 ;




¡ k1 ¡ k2 (E0 ¡ E1)=0 :
Considering (18) and assuming known the time at which the environmental
measure is undertaken and the amount of pollution emissions to reduce, we may
…nd the threshold discount rate ^ r that discriminates the values for which the
policy is adopted or not, as in the simplest version of the model. We may again
utilize (18) to derive the relationship between the pollution emissions and the






r2 (r + ±)
2 k2
> 0:
This result con…rms that there is a positive relationship between E and r.
Finally, we are able to highlight the link between E and income by (180); putting
5Until here we have reported a piece of Pindyck’s model, dealing with the case of partial
reduction of emissions, that he handles in section 2:3 of his paper (Pindyck, 2002, p. 1686
ss.).
10in evidence E1 and substituting for E0 its value
1¡° p
K ¡ I®,c o m i n gf r o m(9),











Even in cases of partial reduction of pollution emissions we are able to show
that E and I increase together if a pollution policy is not implemented. Now we
may consider the dynamics of pollution as the income changes when a partial
reduction of emissions is allowed. As in the previous version of the model we
employ (1), and substituting (15) for M(t), we obtain

















T h e… r s tl i n eo f(21) describes _ M when 0 · t · T and r>^ r,w h i l et h e
second row explains the dynamics of pollution stock when t>Tand r<^ r, i.e.
the policy is launched.






















< 0; for r<^ r
:
It is easy to note that when 0 · t · T and r>^ r, the dynamics of _ M with
r e s p e c tt ot h ei n c o m ea r et h es a m ea si nc a s e sw h e r et h ep o l i c ya d o p t i o ni m -
plies that E falls instantaneously to zero, while in the hypothesis of expenses for
partial reduction of pollution emissions (t>Tand r>^ r), _ M will decline slowly.
Note that
¯ ¯I®¡1®r (r + ±)e¡±t=µ0
¯ ¯ <










1 ¡ e¡±(t¡T)¤ª¯ ¯ . We may prove this result letting the partial derivative of
_ M with respect to the income be equal to zero, when 0 · t · T and t>T,t o
see that
¯ ¯r(r + ±)e¡±t=µ0
¯ ¯ >








¡e¡±(t¡T)], such that the result holds.
Observe that _ M is a concave-increasing function of income for r>^ r and
concave-decreasing in I for r<^ r. In this way we are able to represent in Figure
three, that we report below, the income-pollution pattern in case of partial
reduction of pollution emissions.
[Figure 3, about here]
Note that the variables reported in both axes are as in picture two. Here we
obtain an inverse U-shaped EKC, in which the decreasing part of the curve falls
more slowly than the rising one. When the partial reduction of E is considered,
a more realistic representation of the income-pollution pattern comes. The EKC
reaches its maximum point when r =^ r at time t = T, at which the policy is
adopted and for a compatible level of the income It.
113.2 Generalization of the Model’s results
Up to now we have ignored the problems of uncertainty and irreversibilities
explicitly considered by Pindyck in the more complicated version of his model,
that he sets out in the …nal part of the second paragraph of his paper. Un-
certainty is introduced in the theoretical framework, assuming that the social
planners may wait until time T to adopt the environmental policy, and do it if
and only if µT = ¹ µ (where µ is the future social cost, that could be either high
¹ µ or low µ
¡), and assuming that the probability that µT = ¹ µ is equal to 0:5.I n
this way the function of social welfare changes and becomes a little bit more
complicated (see equation [8] in Pindyck’s paper).
The e¤ects of irreversibilities are taken into account via a sensitive analysis of
the values that the pollution decay rate ± may assume. These two extensions of
the more simple model we deal with in the …rst part of the paper do not change
our conclusions, but rather reinforce our …ndings. In particular, uncertainty
and irreversibility reduce the net bene…ts of an activity with environmental
costs (Arrow and Fisher, 1974, Henry 1974), recommending the adoption of
an environmental measure even for values of the discount rate higher than in
the hypothesis in which we ignore the existence of these two phenomena. In
other words, the more complete version of Pindyck’s model does not change the
main …ndings of this paper, but rather emphasizes the role of the discount rate
in the choice whether or not to adopt costly social measures to preserve the
environment. In the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility we may a¢rm
that ^ r will be higher than in cases where these two e¤ects are not considered
in the analysis. We can arrive at the same conclusions in the continuous time
model set out by Pindyck in section three of his paper, but for the limited
purposes of this paper, it is not worth using here the more complicated version
of his theoretical framework.
4 Result Comments
In this paper we have shown that a direct relationship exists between the dis-
count rate and pollution emissions. This relation has hitherto been ignored
in the economic literature dealing with the problem of explaining the income-
pollution pattern, at the micro and macroeconomic levels. This implies that
in countries with high discount rates environmentally harmful production pro-
cesses could be adopted, to satisfy the present needs of the population, without
taking into account the rights of future generations.
A threshold level of the discount rate could be found such that for all its
values higher than ^ r, the environmental policy will not be adopted and pollution
will continue to rise. Note that Pindyck himself a¢rms that an increase in the
discount rate reduces future bene…ts and raises future costs, thus motivating the
decision to delay adoption of the policy. In such a way he suggests a positive
link between the discount rate and pollution emissions.
The range of r values that we found such that the net value of social wel-
12fare is positive (at the time at which the policy is adopted), using Pindyck’s
parameters, is consistent with the recent analysis of Weitzman (2001), that sug-
gests discounting the future at a rate included between four and zero per cent,
depending on the length of the temporal horizon considered.
Even in the modi…ed version of Pindyck’s model, the discount rate and
income move in opposite directions, so that for the pair of values of low income
and high discount rate the net present value of social welfare will be negative, if
the policy is implemented, such that emissions and pollution stock both increase.
This happens until the growth reduces the discount rate to its threshold level,
such that environmental measure will be undertaken, because the net present
value of social welfare is positive.
In this way we are able to demonstrate why for low levels of income - and
high discount rates - countries show a positive relationship between income and
pollution, while the opposite happens when countries become wealthier and
show a low discount rate. Rich nations adopt a lower r in their decisions than
poor countries (showing high preferences for the future), in the choice whether
to adopt a costly policy to preserve the environment, even in cases in which
irreversibilities and uncertainty are involved.
From equations (13) and (22) it is evident that for r>^ r there is a positive
relationship between the discount rate and pollution stock dynamics, while for
r<^ r the stock of pollution declines during time, as a consequence of pollution
abatement expenditure.
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dt w ov e r s i o n so ft h es a m em o d e l . I nt h e
…rst, we undertake the hypothesis that when a policy is launched the pollution
emissions go immediately to zero. In the other, we consider a partial reduction
of pollutions emissions as a consequence of an environmentally friendly invest-
ment. The main di¤erences emerge in the income-pollution pattern, that is …rst
concave-increasing and then, when r =^ r, convex-decreasing in cases where the
pollution emissions go instantaneously to zero when the policy is adopted. A
more realistic behavior of the EKC is shown in cases of partial reduction of
pollution emission in which we derive an inverse U-shaped curve, that is asym-
metric, because the decreasing branch has a lower slope than the increasing part
of the curve. This accounts for the fact that usually many pollutants need to
be reduced sometime.
In the modi…ed version of Pindyck’s model used here, an inverse U-shaped
pollution-income pattern emerges, without any ad hoc assumption or particular
speci…cation of functions, only referring to the discount rate.
This new possible explanation of the EKC has the advantage of being ana-
lytically simple, and immediately testable, adding to the existing data-set the
discount rate data, or making new regressions changing the econometric model
speci…cation. The discount rate could be entirely used in time series analysis
referred to a single country, and cross countries econometric studies involv-
ing cross-section or panel data. Recently, some authors (Kaufmann et al., 1998,
Stern and Common, 2001, Suri and Chapman, 1998, Unruh and Moomaw, 1998)
have expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing speci…cations of economet-
ric models to testify the existence of the EKC, suggesting the need to introduce
13new independent variables in applied studies on the income-pollution pattern.
In particular, the search for a correct speci…cation of the econometric model is
relevant if the recent empirical analysis does not univocally support the exis-
tence of the inverse U-shaped EKC, leaving open the question of the real shape
of income-pollution relationships.
The implications of our analysis for policy are twofold. International grants
in interest accounts, from industrialized countries to developing nations, could
incentivise poor countries to implement costly environmental policies to reduce
their pollution emissions. Promoting growth in developing countries reduces
the discount rate of the economy, making possible the adoption of expensive
investments to improve the quality of the environment. The …rst measure is
almost new and has never been proposed in the attempt to solve or mitigate en-
vironmental problems. The second policy is quite mainstream, but the increase
in income does not reduce pollution by itself, only through the discount rate
reduction channel.
From a theoretical point of view, more research is necessary to support the
basic intuition behind this paper, with which we may explain the inverse U-
shaped income-pollution pattern in terms of di¤erences in the discount rate
among countries with di¤erent income levels. In particular, our …ndings could
be useful in other studies to explain the behavior of pollutants that does not
follow inverse U-shaped dynamics.
Econometric investigation is still necessary to estimate the empirical rel-
evance of the discount rate in explaining the inverse U-shape of the income-
pollution pattern.
In particular, cross-countries analyses regarding the income-pollution pat-
tern may shed light on the role of international movements of capital among
countries, as a consequence of di¤erences in discount rates, in explaining the
EKC. We think that this issue could be interesting for further research.
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